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CHAPTER 2 
 
Does governance perform?  Concepts, evidence, 
causalities, and research strategies
1
  
 
Chris Skelcher  
 
 
Abstract 
 
This chapter explores the relationship between the new forms of public 
governance and public service performance, and provide an agenda for 
research.  The chapter starts with a discussion of the two key concepts - 
governance and performance – and then explores the theoretical relationship 
between them.  In the next section, the focus turns to the empirical evidence 
on the impact of governance forms on organisational performance, which is 
found to be limited.  The chapter then explores two ways forward for research.  
One approach is to examine the multiple possible causalities between 
governance and performance.  The other is to adopt an interpretivist approach 
to the critical examination of the sets of governance design solutions 
embedded in prevailing discourses.  The paper argues that this offers 
practical benefits for those engaged in designing governance arrangements 
that are intended to enhance performance. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Public service reform programmes have created a greater diversity in the 
governance arrangements for making and delivering public policy.  The 
traditional archetype for public service organisations – the politically headed 
bureau - has lost its monopoly in the face of experimentation with a range of 
corporate forms.  It is now common to find such governance forms as arm‟s 
length executive agencies (Pollitt, Bathgate, Caulfield, Smullen and Talbot 
2001), multi-organisational collaboratives (Sullivan and Skelcher 2003), 
public-private partnerships (Skelcher 2005b), quasi-governmental hybrids 
(Koppell 2003), and public interest companies (Prabhakar 2004).  These 
governance changes are closely related to debates about public service 
performance.  For example, one rationale for moving away from the politically 
headed bureau and towards other forms of governance is that it enables 
greater discretion to be exercised by managers within an incentive-based 
performance framework (Boyne, Farrell, Law, Powell and Walker 2003).  
Managers freed from the constraints of day-to-day political supervision are 
assumed to be able to apply a technical rationality that will enhance the 
organisation‟s performance (Clark and Newman 1997).  The new governance 
forms also potentially offer gains in democratic performance by opening 
additional pathways into the public policy process.  For example, 
neighbourhood regeneration boards often include local residents and 
community organisations as well as civic officials and business leaders.  
 
However there are arguments that change to governance arrangements lead 
to undesirable consequences.  Firstly, the quasi-governmental status of new 
governance forms introduces concerns about confused and weak 
accountability (Rhodes 1997).  Secondly, the fragmentation of large bureaux 
into congeries of smaller quasi-autonomous bodies potentially degrades the 
performance of the public policy system as a whole.  Significant transaction 
costs and institutional barriers create problems of reaching agreement 
between multiple semi-autonomous jurisdictions in relation to over-arching 
public policy goals (Skelcher 2005a). 
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The purpose of this chapter is to explore the relationship between the new 
forms of public governance and public service performance, and provide an 
agenda for research.  To date, there has been little systematic research on 
the relationship between governance and performance.  Debate is driven by 
theoretical propositions and individual case examples rather than an 
integrated corpus of empirically based knowledge.  Consequently academics 
do not have a strong basis from which to inform policy design by 
governments.  This chapter starts with a discussion of the two key concepts - 
governance and performance – and then explores the theoretical relationship 
between them.  In the next section, the focus turns to the empirical evidence 
on the impact of governance forms on organisational performance.  The 
chapter then explores two ways forward for research.  One approach is to 
examine the multiple possible causalities between governance and 
performance.  The other is to adopt an interpretivist approach to the critical 
examination of the sets of governance design solutions embedded in 
prevailing discourses.  The paper argues that this offers practical benefits for 
those engaged in designing governance arrangements that are intended to 
enhance performance. 
 
THE CENTRAL CONCEPTS: GOVERNANCE AND 
PERFORMANCE 
Governance 
 
At its most abstract level, „governance‟ is a way of conceptualising the means 
of social co-ordination (Mayntz 1993; Kooiman 2003) (table 1).  Within the 
public management field, however, the discussion typically revolves around 
the question of „modes‟ of governance.  This is normally formulated in terms of 
the triptych of hierarchy, market and network, and debate hinges on the 
relative impact of each in terms of public service performance, a point 
discussed in more detail below.  The concept of governance therefore takes 
on normative as well as descriptive/analytical connotations, especially in the 
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context of the powerful theoretical and political motivations to moderate public 
service hierarchies with a strong dose of market forces.  Finally, it is important 
to be aware that governance is frequently employed in an oppositional pairing 
with government, to describe the network arrangements for steering and co-
ordinating public, private and not-for-profit activity that have replaced 
hierarchical, state-centred policy-making and delivery (Rhodes 1997).  This 
relationship has recently been subject to some critical analysis (e.g. Davies 
2000). 
 
Table 1: Governance concepts: analytical distinctions 
Concept Definition 
Governance  A means of social coordination 
Mode of governance Co-ordination through hierarchy, market or network 
Public governance The corporate structures applied to organisations that 
make and manage public policy 
 
 
„Public‟ governance refers to the different corporate arrangements applied to 
the organisations through which public policy is shaped, made and executed.  
Public governance includes the formal constitutional design and legal status of 
these bodies.  For example, it includes the rules that set out how a legislature 
and executive is to operate, or how a public-private partnership is to be held 
accountable.  A similar usage is found in the „governance and performance‟ 
literature in the US, where Lynn, Heinrich and Hill (2001: 7) talk about 
governance in terms of „the regime of laws, rules, judicial decision, and 
administrative practices that constrain, prescribe, and enable the provision of 
publicly supported goods and services‟.   
 
Performance 
 
Performance is conceptualised in three ways (table 2).  The organisational 
performance of public service bodies is typically constructed with reference to 
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the metrics of effective implementation, productivity, service outcomes, and 
client satisfaction (de Bruijn 2002).  The basis on which judgements about 
performance are made draws principally on measures of efficiency, 
effectiveness, service quality, and compliance with normative standards.  The 
UK, with its extensive array of performance indicators and targets for all public 
services, is a particular example of this model.  The logic of this emphasis on 
transparent data on organisational performance can be constructed in public 
choice terms.  Theoretically it should incentivise top-level decision-makers to 
take corrective action to address less than satisfactory performance, with the 
added impetus that failure so to do may have undesirable results at the ballot 
box or in terms of external intervention by higher levels of government. 
 
Table 2: Performance domains: analytical distinctions 
Concept Definition 
Organisational performance The substantive outputs and outcomes of a 
public organisation  
Democratic performance The extent to which a public organisation is 
able to demonstrate mechanisms for 
legitimacy, consent and accountability 
System performance  The degree integration of a system of public 
organisations 
 
 
However this argument has an important flaw, since changes in governance 
arrangements in the UK and a number of other countries have relocated areas 
of public service outside of direct control by elected politicians.  The 
relationships between organisations delivering public policy and the 
democratic system that defines the goals to be achieved vary from those that 
are tightly coupled (the minister heading a central government department) to 
others that have an arm‟s-length relationship to elected politicians (public 
interest companies and multi-organisational collaborations).  This observation 
introduces a requirement to consider the democratic performance of public 
service organisations. 
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Democratic performance refers to the extent to which the governance 
arrangements of an organisation enable the exercise of legitimacy, consent 
and accountability (Mathur and Skelcher forthcoming).  Legitimacy refers to 
the political validation of institutional authority, consent concerns the capacity 
of citizens and other relevant actors to agree courses of organisational action, 
and accountability involves the explanation of action linked to renewal or 
revocation of mandate by the principal.   
 
Finally, performance needs to be conceptualised in terms of the overall 
functioning of the governmental system and its capacity to co-ordinate 
activities and resolve collective action problems across jurisdictions.  This is 
termed system performance.  Questions of system performance are inherent 
in governance design.  Where there are large politically headed 
bureaucracies, system performance is potentially sub-optimal due to the 
rigidities of organisational domains.  In situations of decentralisation and 
flexible governance, problems of coordination across multiple jurisdictions 
arise.  
 
Relationships between mode of governance and public 
service performance 
 
The discussion thus far has begun to indicate some theoretical relationships 
between the governance modes of hierarchy, market and network, and the 
organisational, democratic and system dimensions of public service 
performance (table 1).  Hierarchical modes of governance appear to offer a 
means of high organisational performance through bureaucratic control, with a 
clear link to political principals, thus assuring democratic performance.  
System performance is high due to the limited number of public service 
organisations.  However these benefits need to be set against the potential for 
rigidity and proceduralism, and the inter- and intra-departmental political 
contest (Peters 2000).  In contrast, market modes of governance offer 
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enhanced organisational performance as central regulation decreases, but 
with increased transaction costs.  Democratic performance is reconfigured 
away from detailed delivery issues and towards goal definition and outcome 
accountability, while system performance is potentially reduced due to 
contract lock-in and increases in self-interested behaviour in the absence of 
central control.  Finally, network modes of governance suggests gains in 
organisational performance due to flexibility of forms in a collaborative 
environment, and with a transformation of the means of democratic 
performance from a top-down representative system to more interactive 
modes of decision-making (Edelenbos and Klijn 2006).  Network governance 
may be a co-coordinative instrument better suited to the complex, distributed 
authority of „hollowing-out‟ and contemporary global society.  This normative 
conception of network governance draws from theoretical positions that 
emphasise the generative power of co-operation and resource sharing by 
public and other actors to achieve social goals, in contrast to the command 
and coercive power of government (Pierre and Peters 2000).  
 
The empirical evidence on these hypothesised relationships is limited and to 
date has not been systematically codified and examined.  Most progress in 
this task is being made in a major series of studies in the US, associated with 
the „governance and performance‟ project (e.g. Heinrich and Lynn 2000; Lynn, 
Heinrich and Hill 2001).  This project is a systematic empirical (predominantly 
quantitative) examination of the relationships between forms of governance, 
methods of management and public service performance.  A recent meta-
analysis of the literature in the field has concluded that the majority of 
evidence thus far is on the relationships between management and 
performance, and that there is a key gap in terms of the impact of governance 
(Hill and Lynn 2005).  However there are extant research designs to further 
empirical work in this field (Skelcher forthcoming), and some initial work is 
being undertaken in respect of the performance effects of network modes of 
governance (e.g. O‟Toole and Meier 2004).  For the purposes of this paper, 
however, we now turn from the broader issue of modes of governance to a 
consideration of the specific issue of the corporate structure of public 
organisations.   
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Table 3: Theoretical relationships between modes of governance and performance domains 
 Performance Domains 
  Organisational Democratic System 
Mode of 
Governance 
Hierarchy Bureaucracy provides means for 
efficient organisation of work, 
leading to effective outcomes; 
however proceduralism, rational 
choice, etc. pose constraints on 
this organisational form.  
Strong democratic performance 
in theory due to politically 
headed public service 
bureaucracy; but constrained by 
power of professionals and 
managers.  Strong procedures 
for democratic performance may 
limit responsiveness and 
flexibility. 
High system performance in 
theory, although this will be 
limited by frictional and 
structural conflicts between 
politically headed 
bureaucracies, and gaps in 
service provision between them  
Market Potential to increase 
organisational performance due 
to efficiency gains implicit in 
contracting and innovation 
arising from market context, 
although these need to be 
compensated by increased 
transaction costs 
Increases focus by politicians on 
the definition of service, thus 
enhancing accountability.  
Reduces democratic 
accountability of service 
provision due to inflexibility in 
contracts and market 
orientation. 
Reduces potential for alignment 
and change at the level of 
service delivery, due to the 
contractually-defined nature of 
service provision 
Network Potential to increase 
organisational performance due 
to loose coupling to formal 
representative democratic 
institutions, flexibility in 
constitutional arrangements, 
incorporation of key 
stakeholders and managerial 
discretion 
Weakening of traditional forms 
of democratic performance 
through representative 
democracy; potential 
strengthening through 
emergence of deliberative 
democratic forms 
Possible reduction of system-
wide coherence and problems of 
co-ordination and collective 
action on overarching public 
policy goals; however potential 
for institutional creation to meet 
more specific needs, leading to 
more responsive system overall 
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EMPIRICAL PERSPECTIVES ON GOVERNACE AND 
PERFORMANCE 
 
The form of public governance can be understood as embodying assumptions 
about the „right‟ or „best‟ way to constitute an entity in order to deliver a 
desired level of organisational performance.  The public service reform 
movement associated with new public management and its variants reflects a 
change in these normative assumptions when compared with traditional public 
administration.  For example, the new discourse privileges arm‟s-length public 
bodies over politically controlled departments on the theoretical grounds that 
their non-partisan boards will facilitate efficient decision-making and effective 
managed service delivery.  The democratic accountabilities of politically 
headed bureau are regarded as less preferable on the theoretical grounds 
that their organisational performance will be sub-optimal (Skelcher 1998).  
 
These positions lead to the question of whether there is a discernable 
difference in the performance of different forms of public governance.  For 
example, is a multi-agency collaboration structured as a company limited by 
guarantee likely to lead to better or worse performance than one constituted 
as an unincorporated association?  If evidence on the relationship between 
forms of governance and performance can be adduced, this would offer the 
possibility for advances in both theory and policy design.  The issues involved 
in such research are conceptually and methodologically complex  (Skelcher 
forthcoming).  Here, some of the key evidence is explored, as a basis for 
reconsidering the nature of the governance-performance relationship.  
 
Public governance and organisational performance 
 
The first set of studies relates to the institutional economics-inspired theory 
that underlies much recent public management reform.  This predicts 
improvements in organisational performance where an entity gains greater 
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autonomy from politicians and greater engagement with market forces.  
Dunsire, Parker and colleagues examined these propositions in a study of ten 
UK public service organisations that had changed their governance 
arrangements (Dunsire, Hartley and Parker 1991).  Some had been privatised 
while others changed status within the public sector, for example from 
government department to public corporation or trading fund to executive 
agency.  Dunsire et al‟s hypotheses were that improvements in performance 
(defined as productivity, employment and financial ratios) would be positively 
associated with three changes: 
(a) Movement in corporate status away from government department and 
towards privatisation, by way of intermediate levels of autonomy.  The 
argument here is that this increases the exposure of the entity to the 
policing role of the capital market, hence placing a greater premium on 
the productive use of resources. 
(b) Movement towards operating in an increasingly competitive market, 
and 
(c) Movement in management structure from command to results 
orientation, leading to greater incentives for managerial performance. 
The study failed to find clear evidence to support these hypotheses, although 
in four or five of the cases these was some association between change in 
status and improved performance.   However, the causality is by no means 
clear.  For example, the decision to sell a public enterprise can lead 
government to initiate measures to boost its pre-sale performance, hence 
making it attractive to investors and maximising the returns to government. 
 
Parker (1995) subsequently sought an explanation for the mechanism that 
might link change in corporate status to change in organisational 
performance.  He undertook a further analysis of the qualitative data from the 
perspective of strategic contingency theory.  The hypothesis was that change 
in corporate status would unlock the capacity of the organisation‟s 
management better to respond to adjust to the external environment.  Such 
change, Parker argued, might occurred in six spheres:  developing 
managerial leadership, establishing commercially-oriented goals, creating 
divisionalised structures with greater managerial autonomy, introducing 
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performance management, greater flexibility in the nature and location of the 
business, and greater flexibility in human resource policies and systems.  
Parker found supporting evidence in six of the ten cases.  However he also 
noted that such changes might have occurred without altering corporate 
status because of the broader cultural shifts arising from the adoption of the 
managerial ethos in the public sector.  The research did not test for 
differences between organisations that had and had not changed status. 
 
Considine‟s (2000) analysis of Australian employment services begins to fill 
this gap.  He compared an employment assistance system that contained 
both private and public sector operators.   His conclusion was that the best 
private operators outperformed those in the public sector.  However the 
standard of performance by public agencies was more consistent.  Considine 
accounts for these findings in terms of the differential impact of results-based 
funding on public and private agencies, rather than the corporate form of 
governance, and thus reinforces Parker‟s contingency explanation. 
 
Public governance and democratic performance 
 
The second issue concerns the relationship between forms of public 
governance and democratic performance.   A small group of studies (e.g. 
Skelcher, Mathur and Smith 2005; Wälti, Kübler and Papadopoulos 2004; 
Weir and Hall 1994) have used criteria-based methods derived from the 
„quality of democracy‟ literature to assess the democratic performance of 
national and local quangos, and multi-organisational collaborations in the UK.  
They find that these bodies have lower levels of democratic performance than 
elected bodies.  Multi-organisational collaborations in particular tend to have a 
wide variation in the extent of their democratic performance.   
 
However it can be argued from a managerialist perspective that reduced 
public transparency and accountability requirements can have a positive 
impact on organisational performance by allowing managers discretion in 
designing strategies to resolve public policy problems, and especially those 
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with a significant technical component or where public views are sharply 
divided.   This is not to say that such decisions are somehow „outside‟ politics.  
However policy deliberation could conceivably be aided by locating it in an 
arena in which competitive partisan politics is not the norm.  This view has two 
somewhat conflicting justifications.  One is the empiricist technocratic position 
that the application of „value-free‟ knowledge and expertise holds out the 
promise of the wider public interest being served.  The other is the populist 
democratic view that participation by all actors involved in a public policy issue 
offers the prospect of initial positions being transformed through informed 
dialogue such that a collective agreement is reached (Barber 1984; Reich 
1990).     
 
Some support comes from van Thiel‟s (2001) study of two Dutch ZBOs 
(quangos).  Her initial conclusion, like that of Dunsire et al, is that change in 
organisational status does not necessarily lead to more efficient and effective 
policy implementation.  However she conjectures that the political efficiency 
produced by quangos may be more important than their economic efficiency.  
This takes us in the direction of the theory of credible commitment (Bertelli 
2006; Elgie and McMenamin 2005; Miller 2000), in which the arm‟s-length 
status of a public function insulates it from political contest and enables 
relatively uninterrupted policy implementation to proceed.  Thus Moe‟s (2001) 
view is that, paradoxically, the lower level of accountability of US quasi-
governmental bodies has an important benefit for the elected government. 
 
Public governance and system performance 
 
The third area of investigation concerns the relationship between public 
governance and system performance.  Foster‟s (1997) study of special 
purpose governments in the US examines the proposition that single purpose 
public bodies have a capacity for focus that is more difficult to achieve where 
services are bundled together in a multi-purpose organisation, and that this is 
likely to be translated into stronger organisational performance.  Foster uses 
the extensive US Census of Government data set to undertake a quantitative 
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comparison between areas where single purpose districts are widespread and 
those where multi-functional government is the norm.  She demonstrates that 
single purpose governments have three main effects.  First, there is upward 
spending bias, even after controlling for service demand factors.  Special 
purpose governments spend more on capital projects, operations, and 
administrative expenditures.  Foster explains this as a function of the 
economic and political effects of organisational specialisation.  The economic 
advantages of scale are reduced, the costs of coordination are increased, and 
limited political visibility reduces the opportunity for scrutiny and 
accountability.  Second, special districts cause policy-shaping effects.  Areas 
with a high proportion of special districts have gains development and 
„housekeeping‟ functions (i.e. collective consumption services such as 
libraries and parks), while social welfare services loose.  She comments: 
 
Given an opportunity to make discrete, rather than bundled, choices in 
a public services marketplace, middle- and upper-income residents are 
apt to pass over social welfare services, from which they derive little 
direct benefit, in favour of development and housekeeping services, 
which offer more direct payoffs to individual utility.  (1997: 223).   
 
Finally, Foster turns to the question of system performance.  She finds that 
areas with a high proportion of special districts impact on the institutional 
capacity of system-wide governance.  They aggravate co-ordination problems 
in areas that are politically fragmented (i.e. where policies and interests 
diverge) but conversely provide a means of accommodating diversity in 
politically uniform areas (for example, by enabling a public service to be 
governed by and delivered to an ethnic or religious minority).  This reflects the 
issues examined some time earlier by Ostrom, Tiebout and Warren (1960), 
and that have continue to limited the possibilities for integrated governance 
across metropolitan areas in many parts of the US.    
 
Initial conclusions 
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The main conclusions from these empirical studies are: 
1. Change in governance arrangements per se do not cause changes in 
organisational performance.  But where they involve greater 
organisational autonomy, they do motivate changes in management 
that can have a positive effect on organisational performance. 
2. Changes in governance arrangements towards arm‟s-length status are 
associated with lower levels of democratic performance, over and 
above the loss of electoral competence. 
3. Areas where governance arrangements are polycentric and specialised 
exhibit upward spending bias, oriented towards development and 
collective consumption services and away from social welfare services. 
4. Single-purpose entities increase coordination problems but offer the 
potential for local communities to meet their distinctive service needs. 
 
This analysis has four implications.  First, the theoretical connections between 
forms of public governance and organisational performance are poorly 
supported by empirical evidence, a conclusion also drawn by Pollitt (2003) in 
his review of the research on agencies and quangos.  This gap is not for want 
of methodological sophistication and analytical energy.  The studies reviewed 
above are carefully designed and professionally executed pieces of work.  But 
the number of potential causal relationships involved is too great to capture, 
reflecting the range of theoretical positions available on the issue and the 
complexity of the reality that researchers are trying to investigate.   
 
Second, it is easier to establish the implications of governance arrangements 
for democratic and system performance than for organisational performance.  
This is because democratic performance is integral to the governance 
arrangement.  Third, a number of governance forms are organisational 
hybrids (Borys and Jemison 1989).  This accentuates the problem of 
modelling and drawing meaningful conclusions about the relationship between 
governance and organisational performance since it may not be clear how the 
constituent elements of the hybrid form will interact.  For example, Cornford 
and Edwards (1999) show how the boards of non-profit organisations employ 
a variety of different roles and approaches.  A classic tension for nominees 
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from public service organisations who hold positions as directors on 
companies created to deliver non-profit activity is between the strict view of 
the legal obligation on them to „put the interests of the company first‟, or a 
more relaxed interpretation since they hold their directorships precisely to 
represent the interests of their nominating organisation.   
 
Fourth, the studies show that positivist social science can take us so far in 
understanding the relationships between governance forms and 
organisational performance, but to date has not provided more than 
contingent findings.  Even research that sets out to test the parsimonious 
hypotheses of public choice theory has difficulty in attributing changes in 
organisational performance to the policy prescriptions arising from this school 
of thought, as Boyne et al (2003) show in their careful analysis of three areas 
of UK public policy.  Consequently there is a question about whether it is 
possible to uncover or validate scientific associations between governance 
arrangements to public service performance.  Yet despite this, we see no 
signs that policy makers are lessening their willingness to engage in 
institutional design of new governance arrangements.  If social science is to 
contribute to this process, it needs a new entry point. 
 
DEVELOPING THE RESEARCH AGENDA ON GOVERNANCE 
AND PERFORMANCE 
 
The development of the research agenda contains at least two elements.  The 
first element is to critically examine the implied causality in predominant 
models of public service reform that particular changes in public service 
governance design will lead to improvements in performance.  This section 
sets out a number of alternative causalities, illustrated with small-scale case 
studies undertaken in Denmark, the UK, the US, and the Netherlands during 
2004.  The focus of the discussion is specifically on the organisational 
dimension of performance; space does not permit the analysis to be extended 
into democratic or system dimensions of performance.  The second strand in 
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a research agenda should be to consider the methodological approaches to 
be used by researchers in the field.  The literature to date has largely used 
quantitative hypothesis testing operating from a positivist epistemology.  
However there are significant opportunities for knowledge development by 
adopting interpretivist approaches. 
Exploring patterns of causality 
 
The core hypothesis (H1) informing the policy of creating new forms of public 
governance, and the positivist assessment of their relationship to 
performance, is that the arrow of causality runs from „governance‟ (G) to 
„performance‟ (P) thus: 
 
H1: G             P 
 
In other words, performance is dependent on governance (for the sake of 
explication, intervening variables are ignored).  For example, in the late 1990s 
politicians in England were concerned that a significant proportion of young 
people who left compulsory education system were neither going into the 
labour market or into further education.  The policy response was to create an 
integrated occupational advice and personal support service delivered 
through local agencies.  The creation of these agencies as independently 
constituted companies was specifically intended to create a distinctive identity 
and organisational coherence, and to demonstrate their independent of the 
agencies that had previously delivered these services.  This focus was 
considered to be essential if performance in delivering the policy goal was to 
improve relative to the previous organisationally fragmented system.   
 
H1 is only one of a number of other possible hypotheses.  The converse to H1 
is that governance arises because of performance (H2).   
 
H2: G             P 
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Here, the design of the corporate form is motivated by the need to offer a 
framework to legitimate existing performance.  For example, a small town in 
England had a very active but informal community network.  The organisation 
was able to mobilise community efforts to deliver outcomes for the area, but 
was marginalised in its work because it lacked a formal corporate status.  It 
decided to transform itself into a community-controlled company limited by 
guarantee in order to give its activities higher status with other organisations 
operating in the area.  The form of public governance provided a wrap-around 
structure to legitimise the organisation in the eyes of key stakeholders, and to 
provide assurance for its performance in the future.  However the ethos of the 
informal network was retained as far as possible.  For example, the design of 
the board‟s accountability arrangements included considerable opportunity for 
citizen involvement. 
 
A further variant is that the form of public governance undermines 
performance (H3).   
 
H3: G             P 
 
For example, a museum and educational centre was established in Denmark.  
Its board was composed initially of professional scientists and distinguished 
supporters.  The museum became highly significant to the life of the town in 
which it was located.  As a result, local politicians pressed for membership on 
the board, a request that was eventually granted.  This change in governance 
inserted a „political‟ culture in to a board that had a tradition of scientific 
professional debate.  This produced tensions.  The scientists felt that their 
contribution was being undervalued.  The politicians thought that the museum 
was not sufficiently in touch with local people.  Until they were resolved, these 
issues reduced the capacity of the board to focus on improving the service 
performance of the museum.  
 
The fourth hypothesis (H4) is that performance undermines the form of 
governance.   This can be seen as the precursor of H1. 
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H4: G             P 
 
 
There are numerous instances where a concern that a public service is not 
performing at a sufficient level results in a change of governance form.  For 
example, the widespread introduction of quasi-governmental organisations 
(quangos) of various forms in the UK and the US was motivated by a view 
that the public bureau form of governance had contributed to 
underperformance (Koppell 2003; Skelcher 1998).  Conversely, high levels of 
service performance by units within a public service bureaucracy may lead to 
a bid for greater autonomy, thus undermining the prevailing form of 
governance. 
 
The fifth hypothesis is that governance forms are the symbols used in a 
political struggle between different actors to capture the current or future 
performance of an organisation (H5).  In other words, what is important is not 
performance per se, but the ability of different interests to attribute or explain 
that performance in terms of the form of public governance preferred by each 
(G1, G2… Gn).  Thus, if we assume that there are two contesting actors A1 
(favouring governance form G1) and A2 (favouring governance form G2), A1 
will present the argument that G1 will produce the desired performance and 
that G2 will not:  
 
H5: G1             P;   G2             P 
                     
For example, bodies established as trading concerns but operating within a 
regulatory framework can explain their good (or poor) performance in two 
ways.  It could be due to the organisation‟s board being able to operate in 
ways that are close to conventional business practice (or else, why adopt this 
model?).  Or it could be due to the regulatory framework operated by 
government (or else, why create one?).  Commercial orientation and 
governmental regulation are a compromise between market freedoms and 
government values.  And because they are a compromise, there will always 
be a tension reflected in actors‟ attempts to negotiate the boundary to their 
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advantage.  Wettenhall (1998) illustrates this with reference to the changing 
design of government-owned companies in Australia.  The governance form 
(enterprise model or public interest regulation) thus becomes a symbol to be 
deployed in this process of negotiation. 
 
The final and sixth hypothesis is that governance and performance are 
unrelated (H6). 
 
H6: G             P 
 
In this case, performance is a function of other variables including tradition, 
management, the nature of the community served, or the level of resources.  
Governance is there to provide an assurance of accountability and control, but 
operates at one remove from concerns about service performance.   
 
Overall, therefore, the governance-performance causality is complex.  The 
search by political actors for an institutional design that will deliver policy 
goals to a desired level of performance assumes that the causality runs in the 
direction indicated in H1.  But there are a number of other possibilities, 
especially as one moves the analysis away from an apolitical environment 
and into the contestation found in governmental environments.  Here, forms of 
governance are aligned with different discourses associated with competing 
sets of actors (Skelcher, Mathur and Smith 2005). 
 
Reformulating the research design 
 
This leads to the question of how researchers should respond to the problem 
of exploring the governance-performance relationship.  At the level of 
generalisable, empirically supported causal statements, social science 
research has been able to contribute little to the normative project of 
designing governance institutions.  There is certainly theory, and this has 
informed the design of public policy initiatives.  But the empirical evidence on 
the relationship between governance arrangements and organisational 
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performance is weak.  We simply do not know whether outcomes are 
achieved more effectively through an agency, a multi-organisational 
collaboration, or a politically headed bureau.  What are the options, then, for 
policy-oriented social science research?  There are two courses that could be 
followed.  
 
The first possibility is to redouble the analytical effort within the largely 
positivist approach adopted thus far.  This is the position advocated by Pollitt 
(2003) in his critical appraisal of the state of knowledge on the causes and 
consequences of autonomous bodies.  He observes that research has given 
relatively little attention to explaining whether agencies and quangos are more 
economic, efficient or effective than any alternative governance arrangement, 
nor with identifying what conditions influence their capacity to achieve these 
gains.  He argues that these, and other, research gaps might be met in three 
ways.  The first is by undertaking work that utilises different theoretical 
perspectives in order to provide a more rounded picture of agency 
performance.  The second is to develop middle-range theory that will help to 
explain variations between superficially similar organisational forms.  And the 
third is to undertake comparative research in order to explain the impact of 
contextual factors.   
 
This option could certainly be applied to the case of research on forms of 
public governance.  However there are two reservations.  The first is that the 
earlier discussion of several carefully designed and implemented studies 
shows that inconclusive results are not uncommon, reflecting the complexity 
of the measurement and modelling problems involved.  The second limitation 
is that the nearer a theoretical formulation approaches to an empirical reality, 
the less generalisable and hence the more trivial it becomes.  The specifics of 
context („the creation of the agency was enhanced by a major allocation of 
resources‟) and individual behaviour („the new director was well connected 
politically‟) squeeze out more generalisable and policy-relevant explanations 
of how public service performance is associated with the particular design of 
the organisation‟s governance.   
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This takes us to an alternative path for social science research into the 
performance dimension of different corporate forms for governmental action.  
By adopting an interpretivist position, explanation proceeds from an 
understanding that the context comprises different sets of logically inter-
related ideas, theories and concepts („discourses‟) that supply meanings to 
actors and offer a guide to practice (Fischer 2003).  The discourses validate 
particular forms of governance in terms of their performance, and thus guide 
the practices of actors.  In the current environment in the UK, for example, the 
discourse of „partnership‟ validates collaborative forms of governance in which 
authority is shared between groups of „stakeholders‟ (a term that is also 
associated with particular meaning systems) (Newman 2001).   
 
From this perspective, governance and performance are understood as being 
enacted in a specific context, rather than being formal attributes of a system.  
For example, the way in which actors in the UK understand the discourse of 
„partnership‟ leads to certain day-to-day practices that produce a particular 
pattern of organisational, democratic and system performance.  Partnership 
may be understood as a managerial technique for working across 
organisational boundaries, or as a means of including citizens in deliberative 
policy making.  These understandings are generative of practices that 
produce particular forms of performance, a point discussed in more detail 
elsewhere (Skelcher, Mathur and Smith 2005).   
 
The task of applied social science research, then, is to uncover, illuminate and 
critically appraise the policy discourses and institutions that that shape 
meanings and generate action in relation to particular policy questions 
(Yanow 2000).   The purpose of this approach is to increase the public 
interest component of the governance design process by exposing underlying 
taken-for-granted assumptions, causal theories and meanings.  This approach 
is more considered than Pollitt (2003) suggests in his critique of interpretive 
and constructivist theories.  It has a place to play alongside research from a 
positivist tradition in advancing effective public policy solutions, but uses a 
different strategy to achieve this goal. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
The contemporary environment is one in which there is considerable 
experimentation with forms of public governance.  At the same time, the 
organisational performance of public services is under pressure for 
improvement.  It is tempting to conclude that forms of governance impact on 
the performance of public services.  The theory to support this is available.  
Hierarchy, market and network modes of governance each have potential 
gains in terms of organisational, democratic and system performance.  And at 
a more detailed level, there are strong arguments as to why particular 
corporate forms might be expected to have benefits in terms of outcomes for 
citizens and users.  However the empirical evidence to support this is 
problematic.  The picture is more complex.  And there are a number of other 
possible causal relationships between governance and performance. 
 
So what is the „best‟ form of governance?  This is a question that can only be 
answered by understanding the predominant discourse applying in a 
particular context.  Ideas change and evolve, and as they do so our 
understandings about preferred solutions change (Blyth 2002).  The artefacts 
that are created by politicians and managers – boards, organisational types, 
performance systems, and so on – have a symbolic as well as a substantive 
reality.  At the symbolic level, they are imbued with meanings arising from the 
predominant discourse.  For example, „board‟ could mean „progressive‟ and 
„modernised‟, or „traditional‟ and „outdated‟, depending on the terms of the 
debate.  The meanings are used to interpret the performance of the 
organisation.   
 
The interpretivist approach outlined above offers practical contributions to the 
real world dilemmas of policy makers.  It does this by exposing the taken-for-
granted and providing a critical insight into the institutional design solutions 
that are embedded in the prevailing discourse.  In this way the analytical 
contribution of this social science method offers insights to the deliberative 
process through which public policy and governance arrangements are now 
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more commonly designed.  Its value is in helping to clarify the choices facing 
policy makers, and in so doing contributes to a more informed debate in a 
complex world. 
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